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RECONSTRUCTING JOURNALISTS' PRIVILEGE
Eric M Freedman*

In responding from a law professor's perspective to the views of
the other participants in this discussion-to whom I am grateful for
many valuable interchanges stretching back decades-it is not my
purpose to essay a comprehensive discussion of the vast academic
literature on journalistic privilege, nor to provide a full survey of the
judicial landscape, nor yet to assess the details of the various current
proposals for a federal shield law.'
My hope instead is to suggest concisely a few general thoughts that
may be helpful to future efforts in all three areas.

* Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Hofstra University
School of Law. B.A., Yale University, 1975; M.A., Victoria University of Wellington (New
Zealand), 1977; J.D., Yale University, 1979; http://law.hofstra.edu/Directory/Faculty/
FullTimeFaculty/ftfacefreedman.html.
Permission is hereby granted to individuals and nonprofit or institutions to reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long
as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Cardozo Law Review, and includes
this provision and copyright notice.
My warm thanks to the invaluable Patricia A. Kastings of the Deane Law Library at Hofstra
Law School and to Hofstra Law School students Anthony Lekas, Ruth Mariampolski, Charles
Mondora, and Tamara Schmidt for research support.
For the reasons indicated in the first two pararaphs of the text, all of the citations in the
footnotes that accompany these comments aim to be illustrative only.
I See generally Bree Nordenson, The Shield Bearer, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., May/June
2007, at 48 (describing legislative efforts since 2004). I would note, however, that this is not the
first time Congress has considered the problem, see The Question of Federal "Newsmen's Shield
Legislation'"--Past Legislative Actions and Court Cases Cited, 52 CONG. DIG. 132 (1973)
(reporting that first federal shield legislation was introduced by Republican Senator Arthur
Kapper of Kansas in 1929), and that it has in the past collected a considerable amount of
information bearing on the problem. See, e.g., Newsmen's Privilege: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. on the Judiciaryof the United States Senate, on
S. 36, S. 158, S. 318, S. 451, S. 637, S. 750, S. 870, S. 917, S. 1128 andS.J. Res. 8, Bills to Create
a Testimonial Privilegefor Newsmen, 93d Cong. 1 (1973) [hereinafter Testimonial Privilege];
Newsmen's Privilege, Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the
House of Representativeson H.R. 717, To Assure the Free Flow of Information to the Public and
Related Measures, 93d Cong. 1 (1973) [hereinafter Free Flow]; Freedom of the Press, Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 92d Cong. 1-2 (1972). As suggested infra in notes 49-53, 61 and accompanying text, this
material would repay careful re-reading.
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DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The problem centers upon a source who "is unwilling to disclose
his information except to a reporter under a promise of confidentiality. '2
If the promise is honored, the source's information, but not his or
her name, will enrich public dialogue.3 If it is not, there may perhaps be
a present gain, but future sources will simply remain silent "and the
public dialogue will inevitably be impoverished."'4 Notwithstanding the
distorting effect of a short-term focus on the individual case-which
offers the glittering illusion of a full rather than a half loaf-the true
long-term choice is between half a loaf and none.
In its nature this negative proposition cannot be proven decisively. 5
But a good deal of constitutional law designed to keep speech from
being chilled 6-including doctrines protecting anonymous speech 7-has
2 Eric M. Freedman, Freedom ofInformation and the First Amendment in a Bureaucratic
Age, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 835, 850 (1983); see also infra note 18 (discussing non-confidential
sources).
3 As indicated infra in the text accompanying notes 52-54, this is not an abstract statement.
Once revealed, the information is available to be acted upon by a variety of public and private
actors in our flourishing civil society-including members of Congress, who may learn of abuses
that would otherwise remain unknown to them. See, e.g., infra note 25 (listing recent examples
of such revelations).
4 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 736 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
5 But cf Doug Clifton, JailingReporters, Silencing the Whistleblowers, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, June 30, 2005, at B9 (revealing that the paper was withholding "two stories of profound
importance" that the "public would be well served to know" since it could not assure sources of
protection). For a description of the subsequent events, see Ted Diadiun, To Print or Not to
Print: A Difficult Question, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, July 24, 2005, at A2. See also Bill
Shuford, Jr., Note, Newsman-Source Privilege: A Foundation in Policy for Recognition at
Common Law, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 453, 454, 477 (1974) (describing stories not pursued by press
due to inability to grant confidentiality, and proposing recognition of an "unqualified" common
law privilege).
6 See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101-02 (1982)
(holding that the First Amendment shields minor party from forced disclosure of its contributions
and expenses if it shows a "reasonable probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals"); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461-63 (1958) (unanimous) (Harlan, J.) (noting that the Court has
been alert to scrutinize all forms of government action that may have effect, whether or not
intended, of curtailing First Amendment liberties, and holding that the state could not compel
production of association's membership lists since this was "likely to affect adversely" its
advocacy activities by exposing members to community pressures).
7 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (invalidating a statute
prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign literature: "Under our Constitution, anonymous
pamphleteering is not a pernicious fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and
of dissent. Annonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.... The right to remain
anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct. But political speech by its nature
will sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in general, our society accords greater
weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse"); Talley v. California, 362
U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (invalidating a statute prohibiting distribution of anonymous handbills: "There
can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to
distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.... Persecuted groups and sects from
time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either
anonymously or not at all.").
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been formulated in the face of frank recognition that "demanding

empirical evidence of deterrence is impractical because it will often be
impossible to produce."' 8 Indeed, the First Amendment itself rests upon
premises whose validity "has never been proved or disproved, and
probably could not be." 9

II.

WHERE WE HAVE BEEN

In Branzburg v. Hayes,'0 the parties' counsel argued, as Victor
Kovner does here,II for a qualified privilege based upon a three part test

of relevancy, unavailability, and materiality.12 But several amicus briefs
filed on behalf of press organizations argued forcefully that "newsmen
must be accorded a privilege, absolute and unqualified, to refuse in all
circumstances and without penalty to divulge to anyone any information
or source, confidential or otherwise, obtained in the course of their
professional newsgathering activities" in light of the "inhibiting impact
of anything less-whether no privilege at all or a privilege which in any
13
circumstance is subject to defeasance."'
8 Daniel J. Solove, The FirstAmendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112,
155 (2007). The points made in this sentence of text are canvassed at length in Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 731-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
9 THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970). Moreover, as

suggested infra in notes 46-47 and accompanying text, there might be structural reasons to adopt
a reportorial privilege even if the empirical premise were false.
10 Branzenburg,408 U.S. 665. In addition to the lead case (whose Supreme Court docket
number was 70-85), the opinion also disposed of the appeals in In re Pappas (No. 70-94) and
United States v. Caldwell (No. 70-57). See James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the
Developing Qualified Privilegefor Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 710-13 (1975) (describing
procedural history of the cases).
I1 Victor Kovner, Panel Discussion at Cardozo Law School: Are Journalists Privileged? (Apr.
23, 2007), in 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1364 (2008).
12 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680 ("Although the newsmen in these cases do not claim an
absolute privilege against official interrogation in all circumstances, they assert that the reporter
should not be forced either to appear or to testify before a grand jury or at trial until and unless
sufficient grounds are shown for believing that the reporter possesses information relevant to a
crime the grand jury is investigating, that the information the reporter has is unavailable from
other sources, and that the need for the information is sufficiently compelling to override the
claimed invasion of First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure.").
13 Brief of the Washington Post Company and Newsweek, Inc., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 35-36, Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665. (Sept. 13, 1971) (No. 70-57); see Brief of
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Sigma Delta Chi and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., as
Amici Curiae, in Support of Earl Caldwell at 24-33, id.(Sept. 17, 1971) (arguing that "journalists
must be accorded an absolute and unqualified right to protection from compulsory process");
Brief for Amicus Curiae, The American Newspaper Publishers Association at I1,id. (Sept.
20,1971) (filed in Branzburg, Caldwell, and Pappas) (supporting "the absolute privilege urged
herein and in the brief of the amici, the Washington Post Company and Newsweek, Inc.").
Interestingly, the Managing Editor of The New York Times, A.M. Rosenthal, subsequently
testified to the same effect to Congress, see Free Flow, supra note 1,at 241-51, notwithstanding
the much weaker position The Times had taken in its Branzburg briefing. See infra note 15.
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The parties' lawyers apparently took the position they did because
they thought it was the maximum they could achieve, and that
perception was almost certainly right. Having recently reviewed the
relevant portions of the papers of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Douglas,
Marshall, and Powell (which include Conference notes by Justices
Blackmun, Douglas, and Powell), I have seen nothing suggesting that
the notion of an absolute privilege had any more 4appeal inside the Court
than would appear from the published opinions.'
Of those, it was the pivotal concurring opinion of Justice Powell
He wrote
that shaped the subsequent evolution of the field.
immediately following Conference, in a handwritten note that has
recently been uncovered, "I will make clear in an opinion-unless the
Court's opinion is clear-that there is a privilege analogous to an
evidentiary one, which courts should recognize and apply on case by
case [sic] to protect confidential information."' 5
While Justice Powell's published opinion describing a
6
constitutional privilege to be adjudicated "on a case-by-case basis"'
was arguably not quite as clear as he intended-in fact it has been

14 A more detailed analysis of the papers that comes to the same conclusion is to be found, in

Sean W. Kelly, Note, Black and White and Read All Over: Press ProtectionAfter Branzburg, 57
DUKE L.J. 199 (2007).
As the opinions appeared in print, the principal dissent would have held that:
when a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal confidences ... the
government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has
information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2)
demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less
destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and
overriding interest in the information.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
Justice Douglas in a lone dissent wrote that a reporter has complete immunity from
appearing before a grand jury because:
absent his involvement in a crime, the First Amendment protects him.., and if he is
involved in a crime, the Fifth Amendment stands as a barrier.... The New York
Times... takes the amazing position that First Amendment rights are to be balanced
against other needs or conveniences of government. My belief is that all of the
'balancing' was done by those who wrote the Bill of Rights. By casting the First
Amendment in absolute terms, they repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated
versions of the First Amendment which both the Government and the New York Times
advance in the case.
Id. at 712-13 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Regrettably Justice Douglas failed to
make the tightly-focused policy-based arguments applicable to the specific context at hand that
had been so well made by the amici briefs arguing for an absolute privilege. As a result, his
views have had little subsequent influence.
15 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Notes on Conference of February 25, 1972, Branzburg v. Hayes (No.
70-57), in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Washington and Lee University School of Law. A
reproduction of the document accompanies Adam Liptak, A Justice's Scribbles on Journalists'
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, at WK5 and it is noted in Kelly, supra note 14, at 210.
16Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
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described as "singularly opaque" 1 7-the combined effects of the vote
line-up in Branzburg, the efforts of the press to make lemonade out of
the dicta in a decision whose holdings were First Amendment lemons,
and a widespread receptivity in the state and lower federal courts to
those efforts were that the "case-by-case" approach has dominated
subsequent thinking. 18

Ill.

WHERE WE ARE

There is widespread concern that, although the experience of the
last thirty-five years or so has been tolerable as a pragmatic matter, 19
17Goodale, supra note 10, at 709.
18 See generally Freedman, supra note 2, at 849 n.44 (describing Branzburg as an
"unpromising beginning.., from which the field may never fully recover" while noting that the
privilege had since been widely recognized by the lower federal courts and in the states).
Judge Richard Posner, in the course of an opinion that rejected a claim for protection of nonconfidential journalistic sources without seriously grappling with the underlying policy concerns,
see, e.g, In re Woodhaven Lumber & Mill Work, 589 A.2d 135, 141-43 (N.J. 1991) (construing
shield law based on "protection of editorial judgment rather than the guarding of confidential
sources," in order "to prevent the State from continually and increasingly calling on press
resources in its investigations"); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 523 N.E.2d 277, 279-80 (N.Y.
1988) (recognizing State and federal constitutional protection against discovery of nonconfidential materials in interests of autonomy of press and protection against disruption of its
operations), used the ambiguity of the published Powell opinion as the launching point for a
tendentious history of its subsequent treatment by the courts. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d
530, 531-33 (7th Cir. 2003). Whatever the merits of his appraisals might have been, they should
now be re-assessed in light of Justice Powell's note quoted supra in the text accompanying note
15, which describes the privilege as one "which courts should recognize and apply." In this spirit
I abjure my 1983 statement, Freedman, supra note 2, at 850 n.45, that obtaining non-confidential
information from the press raises no First Amendment difficulties.
19 Anthony Lewis, Panel Discussion at Cardozo Law School: Are Journalists Privileged?
(Apr. 23, 2007), in 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1354-55 (2008). Libel cases are an area in which
workable results have been achieved during the period. Instead of woodenly applying the three
part-test described supra in the text accompanying note 12-a test that, because of its inherent
bias in favor of disclosure, see infra text accompanying note 30, the press will necessarily lose in
this context, see, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d. 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (ordering discovery of
source's identity because "the information sought appears to go to the heart of appellee's libel
action"); Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 459 F. Supp. 2d 462, 466-67 (E.D. Va. 2006), unless
plaintiff's lawyer is sloppy, see, e.g., LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th
Cir. 1986)-a number of courts have crafted procedures that preserve the confidentiality of the
source while enabling the plaintiff to make out his or her claim. See, e.g., Laxalt v. McClatchy,
116 F.R.D. 438, 452-53 (D. Nev. 1987); Sharon v. Time, Inc, 599 F. Supp. 538, 582-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Dowd v. Calabrese, 577 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D.D.C. 1983). The more significant
problem for the press in the libel area is that, with relatively few exceptions, see, e.g., Edwards v.
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting liability for news story
reporting newsworthy charges made by reputable disputants over public policy), the substantive
law of the tort has not adequately recognized a defense of neutral reportage. See Keith C. Buell,
Note, "Start Spreading the News ": Why Republishing Material from "Disreputable" News
Reports Must Be Constitutionally Protected, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 966, 982-85 (2000) (surveying
subsequent cases and arguing for expansion of neutral reportage doctrine).
Thus it is possible for press organizations to report quite accurately that law enforcement
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continuing to muddle through is no longer viable.
Against a
background of intense competition for legitimacy, credibility, and
profitability in information marketplaces, the rough and ready
constraints on demanding information from journalists appear to be
20
breaking down.
The mainstream press has suffered multiple blows including:
- the self-inflicted damage to its reputation caused by spectacular
21
journalistic malpractice;
- the rising levels both of criticism by alternative information
sources, 22 and of self-criticism, 23 which have combined to contribute
agencies suspect someone of a crime and find the result to be enervating libel litigation. See, e.g.,
Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 348, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that defense of
truth unavailable for correct statements that plaintiff was suspected of planting bomb and was
being actively investigated by authorities); Jeffry Scott & Mike Morris, Richard Jewell Found
Dead at 44, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 30, 2007, at IB (describing how an Olympic Park security
guard, initially wrongly suspected in bombing, sued CNN and NBC for libel and obtained
settlements; Atlanta Journal-Constitution did not settle, contending "that at the time it published
its reports Jewell was a suspect, so the articles were accurate."); see also Janet L. Conley, AJC
Win
Also
Satisfies
Jewell's
Lawyer,
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/Editorial/News/singleEdit.asp?individual SQL= 12%2F14%2F
2007%4020089 (reporting that as of December 2007 Jewell's final libel claim against the AtlantaJournal Constitution had been dismissed and the estate was appealing "a host of issues to higher
courts"). See generally Developments in the Law-The Law of Media: VI. Media Liabilityfor
Reporting Suspects' Identities: A Comparative Analysis, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1043, 1045-46
(2007).
The real point of Mr. Lewis's example seems not to be protection of the plaintiff's reputation
(which can be dealt with as indicated in the first paragraph of this note), but rather that one should
sympathize with the plaintiffs efforts to find the identity of the malevolent government source of
the leak-an approach which is antithetical to the very purpose of the privilege and which,
indeed, has helped bring about the present crisis in the field. See infra text accompanying notes
38-44.
20 See, e.g., Kelli L. Sager & Rochelle L. Wilcox, Protecting Confidential Sources, LITIG.,
Winter 2007, at 36, 41 ("Journalists are more threatened today than at any time in American
history. Never before have prosecutors, defendants, and civil litigants felt such freedom to
demand that journalists produce confidential information. Never before have so many journalists
been faced with the prospect of going to jail for refusing to comply with a disclosure order.");
Douglas McCollam & Leah Nelson, The End of Ambiguity, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., JulyAug. 2006, at 20.
21 See Dan Barry et al., Correctingthe Record; Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long
Trail of Deception, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at Al (detailing dozens of fabrications over a
period of nearly four years by national reporter Jason Blair).
22 See generally Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons from the Schiavo
Coverage.61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 680-88 (2007).
23 See, e.g., From the Editors: The Times and Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at
A2; From the Editors: The Times and Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at AI0; see also Rachel
Smolkin, Justice Delayed, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Aug.-Sept. 2007, at 18 (criticizing press
coverage of rape allegations against members of Duke lacrosse team); Richard Perez-Pena, Court
Papers Said to Show Added Payments by Reporter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A 14 (quoting
executive editor of Times as saying reporter Kurt Eichenwald violated its standards in making
payments to subject of articles concerning online pornography).
In response to the Jason Blair scandal, see supra note 21, The New York Times created the
position of "public editor," an ombudsman who solicits readers' criticisms of the paper's
journalism and publishes regular columns addressing it. See Jacques Steinberg, Times Editor to
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to a perception-whose accuracy has yet to be determined-that the

journalistic performance of the established organizations in the last
two decades or so has been worse than in prior historical periods;
- the unprecedented and much-publicized testimony of a string of
prominent journalists in the Scooter Libby trial following a
profoundly unedifying series of prevarications, compromises, and
surrenders which deeply stained the image of both the privilege and
its champions; 24 and
- post-9/ 11 pushback from the federal government and supporters of
its security policies against journalists doing precisely the sort of
excellent investigative work that brings them into inevitable conflict
with the authorities.

25

In this environment the prospects that the courts will expand a First
Amendment based privilege are, as Mr. Lewis suggests, 26 remote. 27 But
that is not the most pressing practical concern: after all, the very
purpose of obtaining a statute (or a judge-made common law privilege)
Select Reader Representative, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A22; Byron Calame, The Public
Editor; The Miller Mess: Lingering Issues Among the Answers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, Sec.
4, at 12 (discussing adequacy of paper's reporting on itself contained in Don Van Natta, Jr. et al,
infra note 24).
24 See Max Frankel, The Washington Back Channel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, § 6
(Magazine) at 40; Adam Liptak, After Libby Trial, New Era for Government and Press, N.Y.
TIMES, March 8, 2007, at A18; Neil A. Lewis & Scott Shane, Libby Lawyers Open Case With
Denials by Reporters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at A 15; Scott Shane, Many Witnesses, Many
Timelines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, § 4, at 18; Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, At Libby Trial,
Russert of NBC Gives and Gets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2007, at At; Neil A. Lewis, Former Times
Reporter Testimony is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at A16; Neil A. Lewis & Scott
Shane, Reporter Who Was Jailed Testifies in Libby Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at Al;
Katherine Q. Seelye, Times Editor Expresses Regrets Over Handling of Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2005, at Al 3; Don Van Natta, Jr. et al., The Miller Case: A Notebook, a Cause, a Jail
Cell and a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at Al; Lome Manly, Editors at Time Inc. Offer
Reassurancesto Reporters, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A 18; see also NORMAN PEARLSTINE,
OFF THE RECORD: THE PRESS, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE WAR OVER ANONYMOUS SOURCES
152-55 (2007); Joel Cohen, Blame the Lawyer!, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 21, 2007, at 2; Adam Liptak,
Editor's Charge:His Lawyer Fell Short, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007, at A 12.
25 Examples include the reporting of the New Yorker concerning the CIA's secret detention
program, see, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Black Sites: A Rare Look Inside the C.I.A. 's Secret
Interrogation Program, NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, at 46, of the New York Times regarding
electronic surveillance by the National Security Administration, see, e.g., James Risen & Eric
Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al, of
the Washington Post respecting secret CIA prisons abroad, see, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds
Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at At, and of Time Magazine
about interrogation practices at Guantanamo, see, e.g., Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside
the Interrogationof Detainee 063, TIME, June 12, 2005, at 26. See generally In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005) (recounting argument of Justice
Department in defending detentions of "enemy combatants" at Guantanamo that "the Executive
has the authority to detain until the conclusion of the war on terrorism ... a journalist who knows
the location of Osama Bin Laden but refuses to disclose it to protect her source"); Adam Liptak,
Cheney's To-Do Lists, Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, § 4, at 5.
26 Lewis, supra note 19, at 1356.
27 See generally Susan M. Gilles, The Image of "Good Journalism" in Privilege, Tort Law,
and ConstitutionalLaw, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 485, 500 (2006).
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is to gain more stringent protection than the courts are willing to
acknowledge already exists under the Constitution.
The most important current task is to learn the right lesson from
the present pressures: any qualified reportorial privilege which depends
on judicial balancing of the importance of disclosure in individual cases
is inherently structurally defective.

First, it provides no predictable standard for when disclosure will
occur-a flaw that is fatally inconsistent with the purpose for creating
the privilege in the first place. A reporter's promise, "I will not reveal
your name unless it meets a three-part legal test that has been subject to

varying judicial interpretations" is hardly calculated to inspire a
28
source's confidence.

Second, it sets up a biased framework for decision-making.
Asking a judge presiding over a case whether the needs of information
to adjudicate it meet the standards of a qualified privilege is like asking
a restaurant patron to choose between the tempting dessert on the table
and the weight gain to be avoided by sending it back. 29 Actually, it's

worse than that. The restaurant patron will at least bear the ultimate
cost of making a short-sighted decision; the judge will not. To be sure,
judges sometimes overcome these limitations, just as dieters sometimes
send desserts back to the kitchen, but success in the underlying
enterprise is much more likely if the temptation never arrives at the
table in the first place.
Third, the judge is being asked the wrong question: how reasonable
it is to make the reporter provide the requested information in this case.
That focus simply ignores the good the privilege seeks to protect:

disclosure to a journalist in the next case, not this one.
28 Of course, if what the source is really relying upon is the statement, "I will not reveal your
name even if ordered by a court to do so and will remain in jail indefinitely to vindicate this
promise," then the legal test utilized by the court makes no difference. In that case, preserving
the public interest by maintaining confidentiality will depend entirely on (a) the belief of the
source in the promise and (b) the fortitude of the reporter in keeping it. Although Mr. Lewis has
argued that the system should work this way-and thus he would combine a qualified common
law privilege with civil disobedience by journalists-that is a through-the-looking-glass method
for achieving the desired goal. Surely it makes more sense to safeguard sources by announcing
and enforcing a legal rule of strict protection than by announcing a weak one and expecting
sources to trust reporters to defy it. Compare Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; First
Amendment Hubris, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 1981, at E15 (arguing that "the battle is better fought"
in a system in which interests are balanced in the courtroom and then "a few brave journalists go
to prison for their promise") with Floyd Abrams, Letter to the Editor, Protecting Sources is No
Special Privilege,N.Y. TtMES, Apr. 26, 1981, at E22 (responding to this column in a letter to the
editor: "The Law is not usually so foolish as to require a 'few brave' individuals to be jailed to
give effect to promises which are essential to the functioning of our society").
29 See, e.g., Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 694-97 (Mass. 2005); cf
Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint,20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 659 (1955)
(focusing on the single problem before him, the censor "is often acutely responsive to interests
which demand suppression-interests which he himself represents-and not so well attuned to
the more scattered and less aggressive forces which support free expression.").
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Fourth, even if the test is formulated so as to ask the right
question, 30 a qualified privilege calls upon judges to perform a
predictive task that requires more foresight than can realistically be
3
expected. '
IV.

WHERE WE NEED To Go

As the birds come home to roost, it's time to rebuild the rookery.
To achieve the public policy goals of a shield statute requires discarding
the "case-by-case" model of the qualified privilege.3 2 Advocates need
30 Under the version of common-law journalist's privilege adopted by Judge David Tatel in In
re Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., concurring), a court in a leak case "must
weigh the public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm the leak caused, against
the public interest in newsgathering, measured by the leaked information's value." This is the
wrong question because "the public interest in newsgathering" relates to the ability of reporters to
obtain such information in the future, not to "the leaked information's value."
Moreover, that metric is itself constitutionally problematic. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974), the Court rejected the view of the plurality in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971), that the degree of First Amendment protection of allegedly
libelous statements should turn on whether they involve "a subject of public or general interest,"
and instead accepted the criticisms that Justice Marshall had expressed for the dissenters.
Rosenbloom. 403 U.S. at 79 (arguing that the plurality's test would require courts both to be
endowed with "extraordinary prescience" and "to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a
particular event or subject: what information is relevant to self-government"); cf Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (rejecting legislature's
"highly paternalistic approach" based on an assessment of whether it was in public's best interests
to have price information regarding prescription drugs).
Other criticisms of this portion of Judge Tatel's test are noted at Hatfill v. Gonzales, Civ.
Action No. 03-1793 (RBW), 2007 WL 2296767, at *11-12 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2007).
In Miller Judge Tatel correctly perceives that leak investigations pose a special problem
because in those contexts the standard three part formulation of the existing rule of qualified
privilege, see supra text accompanying note 12, is unlikely to provide meaningful protection, 397
F.3d at 996; see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp.2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(holding reporters must disclose source of grand jury leak regarding Barry Bonds' steroid use
because only they knew leaker's identity). But, as indicated infra note 37, the right solution is to
apply an appropriate rule of absolute privilege rather than to attempt to shore up the qualified
privilege by adding yet more balancing.
If, however, there is to be a qualified privilege that includes this additional balancing
component then a distinctly preferable version is the one offered by Judge Robert D. Sack in N Y.
Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 186 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sack, J., dissenting) (suggesting
phrasing, drawn from a pending bill, as a balancing between "the public interest in compelling
disclosure and the public interest in newsgathering and maintaining a free flow of information to
citizens"). This formulation focuses on the underlying First Amendment concern and at least
does ask the right question.
31 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
32 At the time of Branzburg, press lawyers might reflexively have considered reporters' notes
to be in the same category as their own, and the applicable analogy therefore to be the qualified
protection afforded attorney work product rather than the absolute shield of attorney-client
privilege. That, however, was before Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), held that the
privilege extended to questionnaires returned to a lawyer by corporate employees in order to
enable the lawyer to give legal advice to the corporation. The relevance of these doctrines to the
present problem is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 36-44.
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to pick up, rather than continuing to attempt to duck, the gauntlet
thrown into their faces by Justice White: "If newsmen's confidential
sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to be, the prospect of being
unmasked whenever a judge determines the situation justifies it is
hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem. For them, it would appear
33
that only an absolute privilege would suffice.
A federal shield law should mandate an absolute privilege, ideally
one embracing the territory described in the amicus briefs in Branzburg
but in any event one that has no exceptions 34 within whatever clearly35
defined area it does cover.
A.

The Idea

The appropriate model is that of communications between attorney
and client. When a client confesses a past crime to a lawyer, it makes
no difference to the applicability of the privilege that the client is a
slimy scuzzball, nor that the client is the only available source
respecting the facts of the crime that the criminal trial is supposed to
determine. 36 The communication is protected because in the context of
the adversary system there are more important values than complete

33 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 702 (1972). In the omitted footnote to this passage,
Justice White notes at length the inhibiting effect on sources of a case-by-case balancing
approach.
34 Various proposals confusingly incorporating the term "absolute," each with its own
exceptions, have been made over the years. See, e.g., Leslye DeRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman,
The Casefor a FederalJournalist's Testimonial Shield Statute, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 779,
802-03 (1991) ("[P]ropos[ing] an absolute privilege, except in the grand jury or criminal trial
context when confidential information held by a reporter is necessary to the indictment or
prosecution of a person who, if guilty of the crime charged, is likely to cause the death or serious
bodily injury of another person upon release from custody."); Leslie Siegel, Note, Trampling on
the Fourth Estate: The Need for a Federal Reporter Shield Law Providing Absolute Protection
Against Compelled Disclosure of News Sources and Information, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 513
(2006) (arguing for absolute privilege except for "any source, news, or information procured
through illegal means"); see also The Question of Federal "Newsmen's Shield Legislation"-Action in the 92nd and93d Congresses, 52 CONG. DIG. 138, 138-39 (1973) (noting that the terms
"absolute" and "qualified" are "imprecise" and "somewhat misleading" as descriptions of degree
of protection afforded by various statutory proposals); cf Alexander Meikeljohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (in disputing whether the First Amendment
is absolute "the contending parties have not been able to agree on the sense in which the word
absolute' shall be used").
35 Representative Wilson's bill described infra note 61, is an example of such a statute. See
generally Brian M. Cullen, Note, Circumventing Branzburg: Absolute Protectionfor Confidential
News Sources, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 615 (1984).
36 This is true whether the party seeking the information is the prosecutor or the defendant,
notwithstanding the latter's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. See generally Mark
Hansen, The Toughest Call, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2007, at 28 (reprising 1973 case of New York
lawyers whose client confessed to undiscovered murders and whose withholding of the
information led to widespread professional acclaim).
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disclosure. These include (a) the maintenance of an appropriate balance
between the individual and the government-not just in this case, but in
the cases of all other clients who would not confide in their lawyers (the
rationale for the attorney client privilege)-and (b) the preservation of a
private mental sphere within which lawyers make the autonomous
decisions that enable them to perform their socially valuable functions
37
(the rationale for the work product doctrine).
Both values are fully applicable in the journalistic context.
1.

Trusting the Press

According to Mr. Lewis, it should make a difference in the case of
the subpoenas served on the reporters covering Barry Bonds' alleged
use of steroids whether "the leaker was a lawyer who had represented
defendants indicted by the grand jury"-in which event protecting the
source would be "protecting trickery" 38-or, say, a fresh-faced baseball
fan who had come by the information while attending an enthusiasts'
37 See In re Green, 492 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2007). The protection extends to the point at
which the lawyer becomes a co-participant in the client's criminal activity. See id at 981-82
(attorney notes of interviews with client immune from production as work product unless attorney
is "complicit in his client's wrongdoing").
The same paradigm is generally applicable in the journalistic context, with one key
refinement: the absolute reporter's privilege, if it is to be of any practical use, see supra note 30,
must be applicable even in situations in which the government claims that the source acted
illegally by leaking the information and/or the journalist did so by receiving it. This problem has
been raised recently by the Espionage Act prosecution of two lobbyists for the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee, see United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006), a
case cogently criticized by Recent Case, 120 HARV. L. REV. 821 (2007); see also Norman
Pearlstine, A Test for Mr. Mukasey, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2007, at A17 (calling on the Attorney
General to drop the case). See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the
Espionage Act: The Statutory Frameworkand the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y R.
219 (2007); Developments in the Law--The Law of Media, Prosecuting the Press: Criminal
Liabilityfor the Act of Publishing, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1007 (2007); Receiving Stolen Property,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Feb. 24, 1973, at 4 (noting editorially that if government can charge
journalists who receive leaked information with criminal activity as well as "use the contempt
power to force reporters to divulge confidential sources and information," then "the impact on the
investigative efforts of the press to disclose wrongdoing in government could be devastating").
To date, the Supreme Court has uniformly rejected claims that the press should be liable in
damages for publishing information because the source acted unlawfully in disclosing it. See
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528-29 (2001). But the applicability of that principle to
situations in which discovery is sought from the press in such contexts is in sufficient doubt that,
as Mr. Lewis notes, five major media entities decided to make monetary contributions totaling
$750,000 to the government's settlement of Privacy Act litigation brought by Dr. Wen Ho Lee
rather than continuing to pursue in the Supreme Court privilege claims that had been rejected in
Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Lewis, supra note 19, at 1357; see Adam
Liptak, News Media Pay in Scientist Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2006, at Al. To consider this
outcome "fair," as Mr. Lewis does, one has to ignore the possibility that it was the very
publication of the details of the false allegations against Dr. Lee that provided the raw materials
for his ultimate vindication.
38 Lewis, supranote 19, at 1358.
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convention but feared social reprisals for the disclosure. 39 Thus to
determine whether the privilege applied one would have to know the
source and his or her motive. This would both destroy anonymity at the
outset and relegate applicability of the privilege to a murky judicial
calculation of social utility--effectually repudiating the initial premises
for the creation of the privilege, viz. that public knowledge of
information which the source is only willing to disclose in confidence

40
and to a reporter is itself a public benefit.

The difficulties of Mr. Lewis's approach have been highlighted by
the Scooter Libby case. 41 The undoubted fact that Libby's original
leaks were sordidly motivated 42 should, as a matter of good journalistic
practice, have been a factor in whatever agreements reporters reached
43
with him.
But decisions regarding First Amendment protections do not and
should not turn upon the good character of the speaker or the high
quality of the journalism involved. 44

39 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002)
("The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official
retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's
privacy as possible." (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42
(1995))).
40 See Lori Robertson, Kind of Confidential, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June 2007, at 27,
32-33 (quoting one of the reporters involved in the Bonds case: "you make a decision on what to
do with the information, separate from the motives of the sources"); cf supra notes 30
(describing District Court decision in Bonds case) and 37 (discussing Wen Ho Lee case).
41 See Douglas McCollam, Attack at the Source, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., March-April
2005, at 29, 34 (noting fear among journalists and lawyers that privilege would be destroyed
because, "Like the porno king who must be transformed into a First Amendment martyr, there is a
sense that the Plame outing through Novak by his sources was the kind of sleazy Beltway
maneuver that represents the worst use of confidential information.").
42 See Frankel, supra note 24; Murray Waas, Cheney's Call, NAT'L J., Feb. 17, 2007, at 38,
41,43.
43 Moreover, as a matter of law as well as good practice, whatever agreements were reached
should have been kept. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (rejecting
argument that First Amendment precluded imposition of damages on newspaper for breaching
promise of confidentiality).
44 See, e.g., Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (noting in course of extending
protection to Hustler magazine that "in the world of debate about public affairs, many things done
with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment"); Terminiello v.
City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 17-24 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (observing that Terminiello's
anti-Semitic speech, protected by the majority opinion, "followed, with fidelity that is more than
coincidental, the pattern of European fascist leaders"); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 709, 720

(1931) (invalidating statute permitting injunction against publishing scandalous matter unless
defendant showed it was true and published with good motive even though "the liberty of the
press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal"); see also FRED W. FRIENDLY &
MARTHA J. H. ELLIOTT, THE CONSTITUTION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE 30 (1984) (describing

defendant newspaper as "an anti-Semitic, anti-black, anti-establishment rag").
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2. Mistrusting the Government
Similarly under the First Amendment, decisions on what should or
should not be published are left to the independent judgment of the
press even though elected officials believe themselves to have sounder
views. 45 Objectively, the officials may be right in any particular case.
But the aggregate social costs of moving the decision-making power
from private actors to public ones outweigh the benefits.
The
government officials may be wrong as well as right in the specific
instance, and, in any event, the resulting centralization of power would
be dangerous. 46 Hence, there is no system of case-by-case balancing;
47
there is an absolute rule of autonomous private decision-making.

B.

The Implementation

To be sure, enacting a federal shield law based on these principles
may not be politically feasible at this moment. 48 But the task at hand is
not to pass a statute; it is to solve a problem.
In the immediate wake of Branzburg, Senator Alan Cranston
introduced a federal shield statute providing an absolute privilege in
federal and state proceedings, 49 explaining:
45 See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
46 James Madison articulated both concerns in Federalist No. 10. Making the slightly
counter-intuitive point that a "faction" could consist of a majority, he explained that this could
occur if the majority's decisions were contrary "to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community" (that is, substantively wrong) or "adverse to the rights of other citizens" (that is,
tyrannical). See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
cf People v. Huss, 51 Cal. Rptr. 56, 61 (Dist. Ct. App.1966) (suggesting that "[s]peech is free under
the First Amendment, not so much because free speech is inherently good as because its suppression is
inherently bad").
47 Analogously, there is absolute prohibition on the use at a criminal trial of evidence
obtained by coercion-not a rule under which the reliability of the evidence is considered on a
case by case basis. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
48 Moreover, any real-world legislation needs to tackle a plethora of important practical and
conceptual problems beyond those involving the scope of the privilege itself, including, as Mr.
Lewis suggests, Lewis, supra note 19, at 1356, the definition of journalists and journalism in the
contemporary media environment, see Developments in the Law-The Law of Media, Protecting
the New Media: Application of the Journalist'sPrivilege to Bloggers, 120 HARV. L. REv. 996
(2007), and the growing salience of the long-latent issue of potential conflicts between individual
reporters and their communications-conglomerate employers. See Matthew Cooper, Valerie,
Scooter, and Me, PORTFOLIO, May 2007, at 206, 210. See generally Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, Confidentiality Complications: How New Rules, Technologies and
Corporate Practices Affect the Reporter's Privilege and FurtherDemonstrate the Need for a
Federal Shield Law (2007), available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/documents/20070613whitepaper.pdf.
49 His proposal, S. 158, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., is reprinted in Testimonial Privilege,supra note
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I believe strongly that Congress should give newsmen an absolute
and unqualified privilege to refuse under all circumstances and
without penalty to divulge to anyone any confidential information or
confidential source obtained in the course of their professional
newsgathering activities. An attorney cannot violate the canons of
ethics and break a confidence with his client even to prevent the
conviction of an innocent man or to disclose a breach in national
security. Yet we don't hear demands that the attorney-client
privilege be "qualified" to compel a lawyer to testify when he has
that kind of information. Nor do we hear that either our system of
justice or the survival of our nation is in jeopardy because that
50
privilege isn't qualified.

Responding to the perfectly accurate criticism that his proposal
went beyond what was then politically possible, he warned the press
that in yielding to "reasons of pragmatism" and supporting bills
containing "a string of compromises" they were making "a serious
error"-not because one of the bills might not pass (though in fact none
did), but rather because such legislation would not provide sources with
any reliable assurance of non-disclosure and therefore would fail to
achieve its basic purpose of getting the underlying information before
51
the public.
Senator Cranston was right and the formation of sound public
policy (as opposed to the mere passage of legislation) is not advanced
by pretending otherwise.
All public and private mechanisms of
accountability depend for their effectiveness upon the availability of
information. Those who utilize such mechanisms-including lawmakers, business executives who need to know about malfeasance in
their organizations sooner rather than later, environmental and
consumer advocates, and, yes, prosecutors 5 2-will be worse off with
flawed shield legislation than none.

1, at 412. The National Association of Broadcasters supported this bill, noting that it had
previously supported a qualified privilege but that "it is now clear that Federal legislation dealing
with newsmen's privilege must be absolute and must apply to all governmental proceedings, both
State and Federal," Testimonial Privilege, supra note 1, at 587 (March 9, 1973) (Statement of
John B. Summers, General Counsel, National Association of Broadcasters) [hereinafter NAB
Statement]. For a very valuable articulation of Senator Cranston's views, see id. at 45-59 (Feb.
20, 1973) (Statement of Hon. Alan Cranston, A U.S. Senator from the State of California).
50 Alan Cranston, FirstMeans First,TRIAL MAG., May-June 1973, at 31, 34.
51 Id. at 32-33; see also Luther A. Huston, Split Views on Immunity Bill Dim Hope for a Full
Shield, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Feb. 24, 1973, at 7 (summanzing numerous then-pending bills and
witnesses' views); supra note 49 (noting change of position of National Association of
Broadcasters).
52 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 182 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sack, J., dissenting)
(observing that experience of over thirty years shows the privilege "serves the needs of law
enforcement"); In re Taylor, 193 A.2d 181, 185 (Pa. 1963) (explaining that disclosure of criminal
activity that would otherwise go unrevealed is far more beneficial to public welfare than
occasionally uncovering identity of source in context of specific prosecution).
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To take the paradigmatic (and of course wholly unrealistic) 53
situation of the present day, suppose a reporter broadcasts a news alert
that, according to a reliable, confidential source, a major terrorist attack
will strike New York the next day, and law enforcement authorities
want the reporter to reveal the name of the source so they can attempt to
track him down and possibly prevent the attack.
Is a position insisting on an absolute privilege in these
circumstances possibly defensible? Yes. "Public officials are better off
knowing that a threat exists, even if they do not know the identity of the
source than knowing nothing at all. Thus, breaching the privilege in
even this seemingly compelling situation may prove counterproductive
'54
in the long run."
It is symptomatic of the extent of the needed re-thinking that
Professor Stone, a devoted civil libertarian, who recognizes throughout
the article from which this example is drawn, the need to look beyond
the current case in the interests of the future flow of information and the
inimical effect of uncertain legal standards on achieving this goal5 5 flees
the cogent logic of his own position and concludes by endorsing a
statutory "rule that limits the privilege (a) when the government can
convincingly demonstrate it needs the information to prevent an
imminent and grave crime or threat to the national security or (b) when
the disclosure is unlawful and does not substantially contribute to public
56
debate."
The sole merit of this proposal, whose exceptions are as expansive
as they are nebulous, is that it might be possible to enact. That is faint
praise indeed. The goal of passing a statute is to improve upon the
status quo. The public welfare will hardly be advanced if Congress
acts, as it commonly does, by passing a statute whose only utility is
57
enabling legislators to announce that the problem has been solved.
53 See NAB Statement, supra note 49, at 587 ("The parade of horribles which can be
assembled under the absolute approach is long and imposing, but it is largely conjectural. We
know of no cases where newsmen have impeded justice by withholding information relative to
serious crimes, national security, or other matters or paramount public concern. In effect, the
opposite is true. Newsmen, where able to protect confidential sources, have been instrumental in
ferreting out crime."); Testimonial Privilege, supra note 1, at 217, 221-22 (Feb. 27, 1973)
(testimony of Hon. Charles H. Percy, Senator from the State of Illinois) (citing numerous
instances where press disclosures facilitated prosecutions while noting that studies reveal no
reported miscarriages of justice resulting from failure of innocent defendant to obtain necessary
information).
54 Geoffrey R. Stone, The Merits of the ProposedJournalist-SourcePrivilege, 1 ADVANCE
67, 75 (2007); see also Brief of the Washington Post Co., supra note 13, at 28 n.* (suggesting
that if authorities' security fears were genuine, publication of Caldwell's story could have enabled
them to avert a threat to the life of President Nixon of which they would otherwise have been
unaware).
55 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 54, at 74.
56 Id. at 77.
57 A recent example is contained in the U.S.A. Patriot Act, as previously: "After the courts
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Of course the best is the enemy of the good. But it is also the
enemy of the bad. Just before leaving for its August 2007 recess, the
House Judiciary Committee cleared legislation that would allow
compulsory disclosure of a source in a range of cases, including when:
necessary to identify a person who has disclosed(i) a trade secret of significant value in violation of a State or Federal
law;
(ii) individually identifiable health information, as such term is
defined in section 1171(6) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1320d(6)), in violation of Federal law; or
(iii) nonpublic personal information, as such term is defined in
section 509(4) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(15 U.S.C. 6809(4)),
58
of any consumer in violation of Federal law.

This bill is worse than useless. It is harmful. Not only would it not
have helped the press in most of the high profile battles of recent
years, 59 but its passage could leave sources with even less protection
than at present. In most federal circuits there is a judicially-created
60
privilege that might provide more protection than this statute does.
That "might" is a black hole-powerful but invisible-into which
information of public benefit will disappear if a poorly-considered
statute is enacted. To surrender to the view that something is better than
nothing is to subordinate the ends to the means and to let Congress off
the hook, free to ignore the area for decades to come.
The fact that the current prospects of enacting even this federal
had repeatedly found that the states were not providing competent defense representation in
capital cases, Congress decided to solve the problem by the simple device of having the attorney
general announce that it did not exist." Adam Liptak, Greasingthe Wheels on the Machinery of
Death, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 2007, at A8
58 H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. §2(a)(3)(C)(i) (2007); see John Diaz, "Code Orange"forPress
Freedom, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 2007, at D6 (article by paper's editorial page editor supporting
this legislation as vindicating "the public's right to know").
59 The bill permits compelled disclosure of a source when "necessary to prevent imminent
and actual harm to national security with the objective to prevent such harm." H.R. 2102 §
2(a)(3)(A). If identifying an executive branch official who has leaked the identity of an
undercover CIA agent is "necessary to prevent imminent and actual harm to national security
with the objective to prevent such harm" then the entire Libby fiasco, see supra text
accompanying note 24, would have played out exactly as it did even if this statute had been
enforced. And one must certainly be blessed with an active imagination to believe that potential
sources for future stories like the ones described supra note 25, would feel secure behind a shield
like this one. See Lewis, supra note 19, at 1357 ("The trouble with that proposed exception is
that it could easily become as wide as the barn door. The most important press disclosures have
had to do with what the government says is national security: the Pentagon Papers case,
warrantless wiretapping, secret C.I.A. prisons. The government so often sounds as if the fate of
the nation were imminently at stake, and judges tend to be uneasy about differing with official
claims of national security.").
60 See James Goodale et al., Reporter's Privilege, in 3 CoMM. LAW 2006, at 715, 773-943
(2006) (surveying federal decisions); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Privilege
Compendium, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/index.php (last visited Sept. 14, 2007) (same).
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sieve law are dubious should be welcomed by shield law proponents as
a blessing in disguise. It is an opportunity to rethink their legislative
strategy. They should adopt a position like the one that was taken by
the Branzburg amici and by the mainstream press before Congress at
the time, 6 1 broaden the coalition of supporters so that the journalistic
privilege overcomes its current image as simply a legislative break for a
favored industry 62 and re-place the issue where it rightly belongs-on
the pedestal of public empowerment.

61 See, e.g., Free Flow, supra note 1, at 252-56 (statement of Stanford Smith, President,
American Newspaper Publishers Association supporting H.R. 2200, introduced by Rep. Charles
H. Wilson of California, flatly prohibiting compelled disclosure in any federal or state proceeding
of the source or content of any published or "unpublished information obtained or prepared in
gathering, receiving or processing of information for any medium of communication to the
public"); id. at 241-51(testimony of A.M. Rosenthal discussed supra note 13). In a draft bill that
it submitted, the Newspaper Guild proposed a similarly absolute privilege. See id. at 573-75.
62 See Diaz, supra note 58 (reporting this view among business executives).

